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The paper contributes to the empirical research on the micro-determinants of 
income inequality in Southeast European transition countries. The analysis utilizes 
data from a representative survey of 3,300 Bulgarian households conducted in 2007 
and quantifies income differentiation effects related to certain socio-demographic 
characteristics. Quantile regression analysis reveals positive net effects of the degree 
of urbanization and the number of employed in the household as well as negative 
effects of the number of unemployed, children, and pensioners on the per-capita 
income level at all parts of the income distribution. Inequality indices decomposition 
by subgroups identifies the type of settlement, ethnical group, the number of children 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the face of the global recession and related local economic impediments the 
inequality analyses appear to be of substantial public interest. The attention of 
research literature on the inequality concept raises various questions whether we are 
interested in equality of opportunities, welfare, resources, or capabilities (Nolan, 
2009). The focus on income or consumption, as overall indicators for the economic 
position of the individual, leads to a particular concern about the interrelation between 
the inequality, poverty, and public policy. 
The literature on inequality and poverty in emerging market economies has 
almost 20 years of tradition trying to explain the factors of living standards decline 
(see for instance Ahmad, 1992; Milanovic, 1998; Simai, 2006; Tridico, 2010). A 
common understanding is that country-specific political contexts are exceptionally 
diverse in respect of scale, historical background, and socio-economic structures 
(Simai, 2006). In transition countries inequality expansion is related to the ownership 
restructuring and to the transfer of the labor force from the public sector (“egalitarian” 
in essence) to the private one (Milanovic, 1999). It is also argued that liberalization-
oriented government policies reducing the social spending have led to substantial 
limitation of social assistance, which in turn adversely affected social inequality in 
transition countries (Ivanova, 2007). 
Using household survey data from 26 post-communist countries for the period 
1990–2005, Milanovic & Ersado (2008) examine the exceptional increases in 
inequality in most of transition economies showing that economic reform level is 
positively related to the income shares of the top two deciles and negatively 
associated with the income share of the bottom decile. In the same time, their analysis 
finds no evidence for the assertion that increased government spending (as a share of 
GDP) reduces inequality. Using data from the Luxemburg Income Study for Poland, 
Hungary and Russia Giammatteo (2006) shows, on the contrary, that the redistribution 
policies in CEE countries restrain the raise of inequality inspired by the severe 
economic restructuring. 
Since the start of pro-market reforms in 1989-1990 the socio-economic 
transformations in Bulgaria have passed through several stages accelerating the social   3
“polarization” in the country
1. Various deficiencies in economic policy making, 
drastic industrial decline (after the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance), collapsing infrastructures, and the loss of human capital due to the first-
wave emigration have created hindrances to the economic modernization during the 
early transition (i.e. the first half of 1990s) (Bristow, 1996). 
A commonly shared view characterizes Bulgarian early transition by minor 
progress in the social reforms – apart of the political system reform – when the living 
standards of a large share of the population have dropped substantially (Tsanov & 
Bogdanov, 2004). This was explained by a variety of obstructions in the transforming 
social mechanisms related to the complex of economic, social, and psychological 
barriers inherited from the past. Transition period governments were exposed to 
severe policy debate on the painful issues of increasing socio-economic inequality and 
poverty accompanied by intensive out-migration pressure. This invoked an increased 
public interest in anti-poverty policy measures which persists for almost 20 years now 
(Tsanov & Bogdanov, 2004; Shopov, 2006). 
Since July 1997 Bulgaria has adopted a currency board arrangement (CBA) 
thus fixing the national currency to the euro (1 EUR = 1.95583 BGN). This facilitated 
the macroeconomic stabilization and steady economic growth in the years of EU pre-
accession. Real GDP growth rates varied between 4.1% and 6.6% in the period 2001-
2008 and in the same time the nominal GDP per capita have increased from 1919 
EUR in 2001 to 4475 EUR in 2008. However, the official income level in Bulgaria is 
still the lowest among the new EU member states with GDP per capita in PPS about 
35% of the 2006 EU25 average and 41% of the EU27 average for 2009
2. 
The article aims to analyze the extent to which socio-demographic 
characteristics of the household as a whole or of the household head – such as 
ethnicity, type of settlement, household size, number of unemployed, number of 
children, number of pensioners, etc. – could be considered as sources of income 
inequality in Bulgaria. The article contains four main sections. The first section 
(“Inequality and poverty in Bulgaria – recent trends”) comments on the dynamics of 
demographic indicators in the country as well as the poverty risks and respective anti-
poverty policies. Special emphasis is put on the studies of poverty and the attitudes 
toward the so called “direct and indirect” measures for social assistance. The next two 
                                                 
1 See for instance World Development Report 1996 - “From Plan to Market”, pp.66-88. 
2 Source: NSI (www.nsi.bg) referring to Eurostat, New Cronos, Version 15.06.2010.   4
sections present the characteristics of the sample data obtained by a survey conducted 
in 2007 as well as the methodology applied for its analysis. Quantile regression is 
used for the assessment of the interrelation between household variables and income 
level for chosen ethnical communities (Roma, Turkish, and others) in reference to the 
Bulgarians. Decomposition of income inequality by subgroups is performed using the 
class of General Entropy indices that allow full breakdown to between and within 
group components. These empirical results are informative in respect of the main 
sources of income inequality in Bulgaria. 
 
2. Inequality and poverty in Bulgaria – recent trends 
 
2.1. General overview 
During the last 20 years Bulgaria was affected by various adverse economic 
and demographic processes which were particularly severe during the first half of the 
1990s. Bulgarian population decreased by about 13 per cent during the first 15 years 
of transition (1989-2004) – or 1.2 million in absolute figures – of which about 
500,000 were due to natural decrease and 700,000 due to emigration. The negative 
demographic trends in Bulgaria were found to be more extreme and more influential 
to public assistance system compared to other European countries (Mansoor & 
Quillin, 2007).  
 
Figure 1. 
Demographic indicators, Bulgaria (per 1,000 population; source: NSI /www.nsi.bg).   5
Along with this, the model of Bulgarian family has substantially and adversely 
altered, e.g. through a decrease in the intensity of marriages and shifts in the child 
bearing. For instance, the number of children born out of wedlock has drastically 
increased – from 12.4% in 1990 to 50.8% in 2006. Cohabitation has expanded since 
the start of the last decade and has doubled from 4.5% for 2001 to 10.4% of the 
families in 2007 (Mihailov & Nikolova, 2007). The persistent social inequalities 
burdened the social assistance system and hindered the inclusion of vulnerable social 
groups (Shopov, 2006). Additionally, increased migration from underdeveloped 
regions to more developed ones intensified the existing regional disparities. 
The priorities of the governmental policy for income support and poverty 
alleviation can be generally outlined within the framework of European System of 
Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) reporting system introduced in 
Bulgaria since 2006. The data has been summarized by the standard ESSPROS 
schemes reflecting the social protection functions (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Structure of monetary social benefit transfers, 2005-2007. 
  2005 2006 2007 
Mln. 
BGN  % 
Mln. 
BGN  % 
Mln. 
BGN  % 
TOTAL 4674  100.0 5187 100.0 5756  100.0
Health care  187  4.0 206 4.0 194  3.4
Disability 507  10.9 578 11.1 595  10.3
Old age  3139  67.2 3393 65.4 3837  66.7
Survivors 237  5.1 345 6.7 382  6.6
Family/children 411  8.8 449 8.7 505  8.8
Unemployment 95  2.0 130 2.5 126  2.2
Housing /  
Social inclusion  95  2.0 84 1.6 114  2.0
Source: NSI, 2010 (www.nsi.bg). 
 
In a situation with a large share of the aging population (with over 2.2 million 
pensioners) the main share of the monetary social benefits – about two thirds for 2007 
– is observed for the old age pensions. The other funds – targeted to assist the socially 
vulnerable groups – however, have minor shares in spite of the fact that high necessity 
for public support was persistent not only during the early transition but also in the 
EU pre-accession years. 
A commonly shared opinion states that Bulgarian social protection policy 
relates indirectly to the ethnicity of the population and particularly to the social   6
integration of Roma community. It accounts for about 5% of the population 
(according to 2001 Population Census) and its socio-demographic profile is frequently 
characterized by early marriages, relatively higher birth rates, more frequent school 
drop-outs, etc. The ethnic group of Bulgarian Turks (about 9% of population) still 
bears the drawbacks from the human capital loss of the exodus during the early 
transition period (Tomova, 1998; Noncheva & Satcheva, 2003). 
According to data of Bulgarian National Statistical Institute /NSI/ the risk of 
poverty has stabilized at a level of about 14% in the years before and after EU 
membership of the country (January 1st, 2007). However, the poverty risk was 
estimated at higher rates for the children, pensioners, and especially for the 
unemployed where the coefficient reached 38% - 44% at the end of the decade (table 
2). In the same time NSI estimates a quite high share of individuals exposed to the 
risk of poverty (about 40%) before the influx of social benefits endowments. 
However, the main role here is played by public pensions as one of the main sources 
of personal income – after transferring the pensions the risk is reduced at rates of 
about 17-18% per annum. 
 
Table 2. Selected Laeken indicators for Bulgaria, 2004-2009. 
 
Source:  NSI  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Average monthly wage (EUR)  150 166 184 220 279  300
Minimum monthly wage (EUR)  61 77 82 92 113 123
Median equivalent disposable 
income per month (EUR)  121.2 129.6 142.0 164.9 180.2  196.5
Mean equivalent DI per 
month (EUR)  133.6 141.1 152.6 178.4 200.3  214.1
Risk of poverty rate /RPR/, 
total (%)  15.2 14.2 13.9 14.1 14.4  14.7
RPR, age 0-15  21.5 17.8 15.1 18.8 17.1  21.4
RPR, age 65+  15.7 17.5 18.0 17.7 17.8  14.9
RPR, unemployed  33.8 34.2 35.8 37.9 43.3  44.0
RPR, pensioners  14.8 16.4 16.9 17.5 17.0  15.5
RPR, HHs with 
dependent children  17.8 15.1 14.4 15.4 14.9  16.9
RPR, before all transfers  40.1 39.1 40.5 40.5 43.5  46.9
RPR, including pensions, and 
before other social transfers  17.6 17.2 16.9 17.2 18.3  18.4
S80/S20 quintile share ratio  4.0 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.9  3.9
Gini coefficient*  26.4 24.9 24.1 25.3 26.3  26.2
* Estimated by data from the regular Household Budget Survey operated by NSI. 
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2.2. Short review of selected empirical studies of income inequality and public 
support policy 
Regular estimates of the Gini index measuring the overall income inequality in 
Bulgaria are provided by NSI since the start of transition reforms when the Household 
Budget Survey has been reformed. The official Gini coefficient is measured for the 
net equivalent total household income, where “total” stands for the augmentation of 
the monetary components by the “consumption from own production” component. 
The Gini index is obtained as a sample estimate by the regular Household Budget 
Survey which operates a nationally representative sample of 3000 households. After 
estimated at an average level of 0.30 during the first ten years of transition, Gini 
values have dropped and stabilized at a level of 0.25 on average during the period of 
EU pre-accession. After the introduction of the EU Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) survey in Bulgaria, Eurostat publishes alternative estimates for 
Bulgarian Gini since year 2006 at an average level of 0.35
3. 
A comprehensive empirical study of poverty in Bulgaria revealed various 
features of poverty level, income inequality, and their sources on the basis of 
Multipurpose Sample Survey of Households in 2003. The overall and regional 
estimates of poverty differentiation, polarization, their deepness and severity were 
obtained using a representative household sample (NSI, 2004). A range of 
determinants of the probability for falling into poverty have been identified using 
logistic regression models. The econometric analysis revealed that greater poverty 
risks are faced by: large households with more than two children, single parent 
households with children, households of elderly retired persons, households with 
unemployed or discouraged workers. The dummy variables for the rural areas as well 
as for the two main ethnical subgroups (Turkish and Roma) have shown statistically 
significant positive effects, and as a general conclusion, the Roma households are 
found to be most affected by poverty (NSI, 2004: 80-83). 
For the same year and on the basis of an extract of the regular 2003 Household 
Budget Survey data Boshnakov (2005) obtained estimates for the main indices of 
household income redistribution through income tax and social transfers. Significant 
differentiation was estimated for the household monetary factor income (Gini=0.542) 
which is slightly reduced by personal income taxation (1.3 Gini points) and much 
                                                 
3 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/database    8
stronger by the influx of monetary social transfers after which the coefficient is 
reduced to 0.27 for the disposable monetary income (Boshnakov, 2006). 
Several aspects of household socio-economic status for 2005 have been 
studied in relation to the involvement of household members in migration processes. 
Almost 38% of remittances-receiving households used at least three quarters of the 
funds for consumption; also, evidence was found that seasonal Bulgarian migration in 
the period 2001-2005 not only augmented the current subsistence expenditures – 
about 26% of the households with short-term returnees have saved at least a quarter of 
the money as a protection from future income risks (Mintchev & Boshnakov, 2010). 
The attitudes to family support policies in Bulgaria have been put in a special 
focus of a questionnaire survey conducted in 2007 (Mihailov & Nikolova, 2007). Its 
results are of particular interest here as far as they reveal various specific aspects of 
the family social support. The first group of measures – receiving the greatest 
approval by the respondents – concerns the ‘raising children’ services targeted in 
stimulating and motivating childbirths. The highest appreciation was observed for the 
measures “better access to consultations for pregnant women, breast-feeding mothers, 
newborns and children healthcare” and “imbursement of larger shares of kindergarten 
fees as well as of some services for families with children” (about 88%). These two 
measures, together with the expectations for “opening new kindergartens” (85%), 
receive higher valuation by the people living in rural areas and with primary 
education. The approval of these measures increases among the real consumers of 
such policies (e.g. mothers who actually receive monthly benefits for raising a child 
under 1 year of age). 
The second group of measures – categorized as “indirect support for the 
services on raising a child” – received somewhat lower appreciation. These measures 
were perceived mostly as “stimulating the opportunities of the mothers to work with 
reduced work hours” (86%) and as “developing alternative services for raising 
children” (83%). The third group of measures – described as “differentiating the 
support” – contained instruments that are purposefully oriented to the state support 
towards specific active groups of the population (e.g. younger and more educated 
people). For different reasons these measures receive lower approval by both the 
groups with high and low social status. For example, stimulation of childbirths by 
mothers only to a certain age (for example, up to 30) is approved by the Roma (18%) 
but threatens the people with higher education, among whom the approval of these   9
measures drops to 13%. An important results was obtained for a group of people 
(40%) who wish all direct benefits to be stopped and the childbirths to be stimulated 
with lower taxes for the parents – this group increases to 47% among people with 
higher education and 44% among the higher age group (31–35). 
Another main survey result shows that Romas are most active in the search of 
benefits (e.g. 33% of Romas receive monthly benefits for raising a child under 1 year 
of age, compared to 23% of the Bulgarians and only 9% of the Turks). Similarly, 
14.7% of Romas receive targeted benefits for pupils compared to 1.3% of Turkish and 
2% of Bulgarian respondents. Due to their low income level, Romas appear to be 
target group on most of the existing benefit instruments as far as the programs are 
developed by income criteria. This can explain for example the fact that individuals 
from this ethnic subgroup receive about three times more target benefits for pupils. 
On the contrary, Turkish respondents show much more rarely a receipt of income 
benefits even though their incomes are not much higher than those of the Roma.  
As a whole, the strategy for improving the demographic environment through 
directly and indirectly supporting the conditions for raising children receives 
substantial societal approval. The appreciation of measures that would “differentiate” 
the support for young and more educated parents is considerably low. Firstly, 
respondents emphasize that the support should refocus from benefits for parents 
towards benefits for raising children, which in 2007 was done through one pilot 
program. Next, a specific need is declared for sharing the responsibilities for 
kindergarten childcare between the central and local budgets. Along with this, the 
legal regulations which can provoke preferences to marriage instead of cohabitation 
should be reconsidered (Mihailov & Nikolova, 2007). 
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3. Data sources and methodology 
 
3.1 Data sources 
 
Empirical micro data for the study is derived for secondary analysis from a 
database of a relatively large sample survey of Bulgarian households
4. It was 
conducted in 2007 as a nationally representative questionnaire survey with a sample 
size of 3300 households. The survey questionnaire provides empirical data for a 
variety of variables allowing a comprehensive study of the interrelation between 
family patterns and migration attitudes against the range of social, economic, and 
demographic „attributes” according to its specific research goals. The survey was split 
in 2 Sections: (1) “Family Models and Attitudes”, and (2) “Migration Experience and 
Attitudes”. However, the Section 1 (i.e. the set of questions related to the family 
issues) covers only about half of the units (about 1800) due to restrictions on the age 
of respondent – namely, those with a main bread winner up to 35 years of age. 
On the other hand, in order to obtain information about child bearing attitudes 
and respective social issues opinion, gender balance was targeted where over 50% 
female respondents were selected as households’ representatives. For this reason, the 
sample does not represent the Bulgarian households’ population by the variable 
“gender of the household head”. The other 1,500 units were required to fill only 
Section 2 in order to obtain representative results about migration issues for the 
overall population. 
 
                                                 
4 “Family Models and Migration Attitudes” Policy Research Project, Agency for Socio-еconomic 
Analyses & Centre for Comparative Studies, 2007-2008, commissioned by the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Policy (Project BUL1P201 “Support for Demographic Processes Policy Development”) and 
supported by United Nations Population Fund /UNFPA/.   11
Table 3. Socio-demographic structure of the sample. 
 
 Ethnical  group 
Bulgarian Turkish  Roma  Other  Total 
3.1. Type of settlement 
Capital city 
/Sofia/ 18.5  0.3 4.6 8.3  15.8
City – 
district  center  36.0 17.2 13.2 11.1 32.4
Other  city/town  23.6 17.8 38.4 16.7 24.0
Rural  village  21.9 64.6 43.8 63.9 27.9
    
Observations 2717  314 219 36  3286
%  82.7 9.6 6.7 1.1  100.0 
3.2. Household size 
1  7.0 2.9 3.2 2.8 6.3
2  20.2 10.5 11.0 13.9 18.6
3  29.3 17.9 12.3 13.9 26.9
4  28.9 31.3 23.7 38.9 28.9
5  9.4 19.5 18.7 13.9 11.1
6 4.0  13.4 13.2 5.6  5.5
7  0.8 2.2 9.6 8.3 1.6
8  0.1 1.3 4.1 – 0.5
Over  8  0.4 1.0 4.1 2.8 0.7
3.3. Number of unemployed 
0  74.9 35.6 20.1 19.4 66.9
1  19.4 36.2 30.4 38.9 22.0
2 4.7  18.8 26.2 19.4  7.6
3  0.4 5.8 9.8 8.3 1.6
4  0.5 2.9 8.4 11.1 1.3
Over  4  0.1 0.6 5.1 2.8 0.5
3.4. Number of children 
0  47.3 37.2 25.7 36.1 44.7
1  30.1 25.9 20.6 25.0 29.0
2  20.7 32.4 31.3 33.3 22.6
3  1.4 3.9 14.0 2.8 2.5
Over  3  0.6 0.6 8.4 2.8 1.1
3.5. Number of pensioners 
0  71.1 65.6 73.2 80.6 70.8
1  19.3 22.1 16.4 11.1 19.3
2 8.9  12.0 8.9 8.3  9.2
Over  2  0.7 0.3 1.4 – 0.7
Source: Authors’ calculations.   12
The cross-tabulations of the main household characteristics outline the sample 
structure obtained for each subpopulation according to the ethnic composition of the 
sample (table 3). Almost 83% of the units represent the so called “majority” group 
(Bulgarians) and about 10% and 7% are the shares of the Turkish and Roma 
households. Divergence is observed for these subgroups in respect of the distributions 
by household size and the number of unemployed and children. The main variables 
used hereafter in the analysis are those expected to have an adverse impact on the 
economic status of the household. These variables are: (1) type of the settlement of 
residence of the household /capital city, city - district center, other city/town, rural 





3.2.1. Quantile regression for the main socio-economic determinants 
 
Quantile regression proved to be a useful tool when we need to examine the 
partial effects of particular independent variables by observing how they differ across 
the whole distribution and not just at the mean. Introduced by Koenker and Bassett 
(1978), this method appears to be a natural extension to the classical regression 
analysis. The linear regression model provides estimates for the changes in the 
conditional mean of a dependent variable related to changes in the covariates. On the 
other side, the quantile regression model aims to capture the changes in the 
conditional quantile of the dependent variable associated to changes in the included 
predictors. It is argued that the conditional-mean model cannot be easily extended to 
non-central locations, however, notably here is a substantial interest from social 
science research point of view (e.g. the studies of economic inequality and mobility 
have particular interest in the poor – at the lower tail – and the rich – at the upper tail 
of the income distribution). Particularly, the results on a set of equally-spaced 
conditional quantiles can characterize the effects of the covariates on the conditional 
income distribution in addition to the effects on its mean (Hao & Naiman, 2007: 2-4). 
As a special case of analysis, a quantile regression model is estimated in order 
to capture the income differentials in respect of the three ethnic subgroups (Azam, 
2009). We use the method to evaluate how the relation between household log-income   13
per capita (log-PCI) and household covariates (X) for the target subgroups differs 
from that for the reference group at various quantiles of the income distribution. For 
this purpose, a quantile regression model was estimated in the following form: 
[] ( ) ) (
) ( ) ( ) (
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θ θ θ θ
θ β α β α u D D y Q
j j j j + + + + = ∑ X X X  
where Qθ[•] is the conditional θ-th quantile of log-PCI and Dj are dummy variables 
for the target subgroups. The quantile intercepts and slopes αj
(θ) and βj
(θ) should 
capture the differentials between the j-th (j=1,2,3 for “Turkish”, “Roma”, “Other”) 
and the reference subpopulation (Bulgarian). 
 
3.2.2. Income inequality decomposition by population subgroups 
The extent, to which the overall level of inequality can be attributed to 
inequality between subpopulations, or to inequality within them, could be analyzed by 
making use of appropriate decomposition methods (e.g. Jenkins & Van Kerm, 2009; 
Lambert, 2003). Various measures of economic inequality are suggested in the 
welfare economics literature. However, they differ in many aspects, e.g. in their 
sensitiveness to income variation in different parts of income distribution. As 
P.Lambert (2003: 116) notes, “… each family of indices has its particular 
recommendations and uses…. How should we choose in any particular context 
between the indices which present themselves? We have to balance statistical 
attractiveness against ease of interpretation and normative content”. Here we use the 
Generalized Entropy class of indices with the sensitivity parameter “a” (Jenkins & 
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When “a” takes lower values the index is more sensitive to variation at the 
lower tail of income distribution, and vise versa – the larger positive “a”, the more 
sensitive is GE(a) to income differences at the top of the distribution. In other words, 
enlarging the value of “a” leads to increasing the sensitivity of the index to income 
variation at the upper tail. The usual “a”-values utilized in empirical studies are 0, 1 
and 2 where specific formulas are suggested for the cases a=0 and a=1. When a=1 
equal importance is put on incomes across the entire distribution.   14
The empirical results in the following study are obtained for the GE measures 
presented in table 4. For comparison reasons we also present the values of the overall 
and subgroup Gini coefficients. 
 
Table 4. Generalized entropy indices adopted in the study. 
GE(0) 

















































These measures are chosen since it is well known from the inequality theory 
literature that they are fully decomposable into between-group (Ib) and within-group 
(Iw) components (see Shorrocks, 1984; Cowell & Jenkins, 1995). So the GE(a) index 
of total inequality can be decomposed using a simple additive relation: 
Iw Ib I + =  
The between-group component (Ib) is designed to capture the contribution to 
the overall inequality of the chosen categorization (or partitioning) characteristic – if 
just one – or any combination of categorization variables dividing the population in 
separate target subgroups. In other words, Ib should measure that part of the 
inequality which can be contributed to the differences between the subpopulation 
constituted by the chosen partitioning characteristic. The decomposition for a cross-
section of a population at a particular point in time is known as “static” 
decomposition. 
The within-group component of the general entropy index can be expressed as: 
() ( ) ∑ ∑






where pg is the population share, xg is the income share of subgroup “g”, and GEg(a) 
is the inequality index calculated for the units belonging to “g”. On the other hand, the 
between-group component of GE(a) is a ‘simulated’ inequality index obtained by 
imputing to each unit the mean income of the subgroup to which this individual 
belongs. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Quantile regression results 
A basic quantile regression function is estimated in order to reveal the 
marginal effects of selected socio-economic characteristics on the income level at 
each income decile. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the 
analysis are presented in table 5. This initial specification of the model was estimated 
using the natural logarithm of the equalized per capita income (log-EIPC) as a 
dependent variable. The equalization assumes standard economies of scale (with 
parameter 0.5) and is obtained by the formula: 
HHsize HHinc EIPC / =  
 
Table 5. Variables description 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Natural log from equalized income per capita*  5.053  0.725
Number of employed  1.695  1.009
Number of unemployed  0.499  0.897
Number of children  0.858  0.981
Number of pensionners  0.405  0.685
Type of settlement - Sofia**  0.134  0.341
Type of settlement - District center city  0.328  0.470
Type of settlement - Other city/town  0.259  0.438
Type of settlement - Rural  0.278  0.448
Ethnicity - Bulgarian**  0.817  0.386
Ethnicity - Turkish  0.076  0.265
Ethnicity - Roma  0.095  0.294
Ethnicity - Other  0.011  0.105
Ownership of: Dwelling  0.594  0.491
Ownership of: Vehicle  0.403  0.491
Ownership of: Regulated land spot  0.147  0.354
Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.088  0.374
Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.129  0.452
Notes: * Dependent variable; ** Reference dummy variable. The shares of some subpopu-
lations differ from those in table 3 mainly due to: weighting of observations by household size; missing 
values on one or more variables included in the model. 
 
Table A1 (Appendix) contains the main results from the estimation of OLS 
regression and 9 conditional quantile regression models of the initial specification.   16
Most of the variables show statistically significant net effects along the whole income 
distribution. These are: 
a) with the expected positive effects: the number of employed and the dummy 
for vehicle ownership; 
b) with the expected negative effects: 
•  the number of unemployed, the number of children, the number of pensioners 
– in all these cases, increasing the number of individuals in the respective categories 
leads to a reduction (ceteris paribus) in the log-EIPC at all parts of the income 
distribution. 
•  the dummy variables for: (i) settlement types /as compared to the capital city/ 
and (ii) ethnical groups /as compared to the reference group/. 
Other two household characteristics also show significant positive effects in 
the OLS estimation – namely (i) the dummy for land spot ownership and (ii) the 
number of international return migrants (i.e. former migrants who are currently 
residing in the home country). Considering the location at the income distribution, net 
effects of these two variables are generally not observed at the lower tail of the 
income distribution; on the contrary, significant net effects are observed: 
•  for the ownership of a land spot – from the median to the top decile; 
•  for the number of return migrants – from the 3
rd to the 8
th decile. 
The ownership of a dwelling and the number of current migrants (member of 
the household that are currently residing abroad) do not show any significant net 
correlation with log-EIPC. Particularly, the result for ‘current migrants’ variable is 
plausibly indicating that, other things equal, effect of remittances as income-
supporting factor cannot be anticipated in 2007. 
The results from the estimated quantile regression model capturing the income 
differentials in respect of the three ethnic subgroups are presented in table A2 
(Appendix). 
1) The number of children, number of unemployed, and the number of 
pensioners appear as statistically significant predictors with the expected negative 
effect, i.e. increasing the number of household members from these categories has an 
adverse impact on the income per capita level. The ‘number of unemployed’ variable 
has somewhat decreasing (in absolute terms) coefficients indicating the “weakening” 
of its effect with the movement up the income levels. On the contrary, the effect of the   17
‘number of pensioners’ is increasing with the shift of the location up the income 
distribution. 
2) Similarly, residing in settlements other than the capital city leads to a 
decrease, on average, of the income per capita which slightly tends to decrease at the 
higher income distribution locations. 
3) Significant differentials of the net effects of the variables for the Turkish 
group are observed only for some variables and in some parts of the distribution. The 
‘type-of-settlement’ differentials dummies are found negative and significant mainly 
at the lower-income deciles. Also, higher income Turkish households living in the 
rural areas do not differ significantly from the reference group in this respect. 
After accounting for the mean income differential (where lower level of log-
IPC is estimated on average for the Turkish households with an elasticity of –0.364), 
this group diverges significantly from the reference group in respect of the effects of 
the number of employed, unemployed, children, and pensioners – however, these 
effects almost disappear when estimated at the upper tail of the income distribution. A 
systematic positive differential for the ‘number of employed’ is observed in favor of 
Turkish households, where the marginal contribution of each working household 
member is positive as compared to the Bulgarian reference group. 
4) Similar results for the number of household members in different categories 
are found also for the Roma group. A possible explanation for this is the operation of 
specific social assistance schemes that provide larger families with additional 
financial support, other things equal. The differential effects of the number of children 
and the unemployed for the Roma households are also positive and strongly 
significant (i.e. compensating the large negative effects as measured for the reference 
group) – a result that could be considered as informative regarding the in-depth 
analysis of the social assistance targeting. The positive differential for the ‘number of 
employed’ is even higher than that of the Turkish households which reveals the 
substantive importance of employment within the Roma subgroup. 
Interesting result requiring further clarification is the strongly significant 
positive effect of the dummy-variable interactions for Roma households living in the 
countryside (semi-urban and rural areas). As compared to those living in the capital 
city, the large negative overall differential for the Roma observations is partially 
reduced. A plausible explanation for this result could be provided by the fact that –   18
unlike the Romas living in the countryside – those living in the capital city have worse 
labor market positions and reside predominantly in suburban “ghetto” - areas. 
 
4.2. Empirical results from the inequality decomposition by subgroups 
This section presents the main results of the analysis performed in order to 
quantify the magnitude of the inequality that can be attributed to selected socio-
demographic characteristics of the households. These results are obtained after 
weighting of the observations by household size. 
1) We first decompose the inequality separately by the selected household 
attributes. The main results of the inequality decompositions are presented in Table 6. 
(a) The Theil index in respect of the four types of settlements shows almost 
twice higher inequality in the rural areas than in the capital city (Sofia). Having in 
mind that the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to differences around the mean, it 
shows somewhat lower disparity ranging from 0.25 in the capital city to 0.36 in the 
rural areas. In relative terms, the share of the between-group component of the overall 
inequality due to habitation of settlements with different degree of urbanization 
(related to their economic scale, functions, development prospects, living standards, 
opportunities for employment, etc.) is estimated between 12 and 15%. 
(b) Higher disparities are found in respect of the ethnical structure, mainly 
when comparing the Roma (G[r]=0.419) with the Bulgarian and Turkish groups (0.297 
and 0.326). Very high inequality is observed for the category “Other”, which is due to 
the substantial group-specific heterogeneity regarding the socio-economic status and 
characteristics of these households. Overall, the between-group component 
originating from the partitioning only by ethnicity is estimated between 11 and 16%. 
It is interesting here to note that the highest value is obtained for GE(0) index which 
puts a higher importance on the differences in the lower tail of the distribution, i.e. 
focusing more on the inequality among the poorer individuals. 
(c) The highest share of the between-group component is estimated for the 
‘number of unemployed’ variable (19%–25%). Substantial discrepancy is observed 
when accentuating on the upper tail of income distribution – the GE(2) index 
increases from 0.16 for households without unemployed to 0.30 for those with 2 
unemployed and to 0.40 for units with 3 or more unemployed. The effect is not so 
strong when the emphasis is put on the lower tail or the mean income level. 
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Table 6. Decomposition of income inequality by selected household attributes. 
  GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)  Gini 
6a. Type of settlement 
Capital city /Sofia/  0.125 0.104 0.119  0.248
Other city /d.c./  0.158 0.155 0.202  0.292
Town 0.185 0.164 0.178  0.315
Village /rural/  0.244 0.217 0.246  0.361
Total sample  0.217 0.193 0.226  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.190 0.164 0.194  –
Between (Ib)  0.027 0.029 0.032  –
%of Ib  12.4% 15.0% 14.2%  –
6b. Ethnic group 
Bulgarian 0.164 0.152 0.180  0.297
Turkish 0.185 0.193 0.255  0.326
Roma 0.304 0.302 0.397  0.419
Other 0.404 0.439 0.698  0.479
Total sample  0.216 0.193 0.226  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.183 0.165 0.201  –
Between (Ib)  0.033 0.028 0.025  –
%of Ib  15.3% 14.5% 11.1%  –
6c. Number of unemployed 
0 0.134 0.131 0.160  0.275
1 0.176 0.166 0.192  0.317
2 0.259 0.237 0.302  0.367
3+ 0.224 0.250 0.395  0.361
Total sample  0.217 0.194 0.228  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.162 0.147 0.185  –
Between (Ib)  0.055 0.047 0.043  –
%of Ib  25.3% 24.2% 18.9%  –
6d. Number of children 
0 0.200 0.180 0.207  0.327
1 0.169 0.156 0.181  0.300
2 0.194 0.179 0.221  0.319
3+ 0.308 0.343 0.558  0.422
Total sample  0.218 0.194 0.228  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.198 0.177 0.213  –
Between (Ib)  0.020 0.017 0.015  –
%of Ib  9.2% 8.8% 6.6%  –
6e. Number of pensioners 
0 0.220 0.191 0.219  0.336
1 0.220 0.205 0.257  0.343
2+ 0.166 0.155 0.178  0.302
Total sample  0.218 0.194 0.228  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.214 0.190 0.224  –
Between (Ib)  0.004 0.004 0.004  –
%of Ib  1.8% 2.1% 1.8%  –
Source: Authors’ calculations.   20
(d) Decompositions by the last two variables – the number of children and the 
number of pensioners in the household – show quite lower contributions of these 
characteristics to income inequality level. Although inequality within the subgroup of 
households with 3 or more children is quite higher than within the other groups (e.g. 
GE(2) raising from 0.21 for households without children to 0.56 for those with 3 or 
more children), the overall contribution of between-group component for this variable 
is less than 10% (between 7% and 9%). This could be explained by the lowest weight 
of this subgroup (about 4%) in the sample. The between-group component has much 
lower share (about 2%) for the “number of pensioners” variable which does not seem 
to be a noteworthy source of inequality. Even more – the subgroup of households with 
2 or more pensioners has the lowest indices of inequality (GE indices between 0.16-
0.18). This fact provides evidence for a particular equalization effect of state pensions 
which are the main source of income for the pensioners in Bulgaria – and especially 
for the households constituted by pensioners only. 
2) In order to derive some more informative inequality decompositions two 
bivariate configurations of subgroups have been formed: 
(i) “Type of settlement” by “Ethnical group”; 
(ii) “Number of children” by “Number of unemployed”. 
Because the category “Others” has a very small share in the sample, for the 
purposes of partitioning [i] it was merged with the main ethnic group, i.e. Bulgarian 
(table 7.). When both attributes considered in [i] are accounted for, the decomposition 
of indices provides more in-depth insights on the income divergence between the 
obtained 12 groups. Substantial disparities between intra-class inequalities are 
observed in all ethnic subgroups when the location of their residence shifts to small-
scale settlements. For example, the Gini coefficient takes values in quite a wide range 
– from 0.17 for ‘Romas living in the capital city’ to 0.47 for “Romas living in rural 
areas”. Similar effects but with lower quantitative gaps are observed also for the other 
two subgroups. Thus, when considering the two household variables (i.e. settlement 
type and ethnicity) in combination a substantial increase of the between-group 
inequality share to levels of 20-23% is observed. 
When other two – important from the policy perspective – household 
characteristics are cross-tabulated, namely the number of children and the number of 
unemployed individuals in the household, the resulting partitioning [ii] provides even 
higher shares of the between-group inequality component. Particularly, when the low-  21
income part of the distribution is more emphasized (as by GE(0)) the between-group 
component reaches a level of 29% of the total inequality. Considerable gaps are found 
also between particular subpopulations – for example, GE(2) index increases from 
0.16 for “No-children / No-unemployed” households to 0.45 for “2 or more children / 
2 or more unemployed” households (table 7.b). These results clearly identify the 
combination of these two variables – having substantial social and economic 
importance – as other intensive sources of inequalities. 
 
Table 7. Decomposition of inequality by bi-dimensional partitioning 
 
  GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)  Gini 
7.a. “Ethnical group” by “Type of settlement” 
Bulg.+Other / Sofia  0.116 0.101 0.113  0.240
Turkish / Sofia  – – –  –
Roma / Sofia  0.052 0.057 0.065  0.167
Bulg.+Other / City  0.143 0.143 0.190  0.278
Turkish / City  0.181 0.189 0.230  0.331
Roma / City  0.145 0.131 0.130  0.284
Bulg.+Other / Town  0.130 0.120 0.129  0.269
Turkish / Town  0.266 0.305 0.452  0.399
Roma / Town  0.231 0.227 0.280  0.364
Bulg.+Other / Rural  0.208 0.184 0.201  0.333
Turkish/ Rural  0.158 0.155 0.192  0.296
Roma / Rural  0.388 0.379 0.499  0.470
Total sample  0.216 0.193 0.225  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.169 0.149 0.181  –
Between (Ib)  0.047 0.044 0.044  –
%of Ib  21.8% 22.8% 19.6%  –
7.b. “N. of children” by “N. of unemployed” 
0  /  0  0.144 0.135 0.158  0.281
0  /  1  0.141 0.128 0.136  0.280
0  /  2+  0.245 0.239 0.304  0.372
1  /  0  0.111 0.115 0.139  0.257
1  /  1  0.162 0.158 0.198  0.300
1  /  2+  0.246 0.199 0.201  0.348
2+ /  0  0.133 0.131 0.170  0.267
2+ /  1  0.176 0.176 0.206  0.326
2+ /  2+  0.240 0.263 0.452  0.363
Total sample  0.217 0.194 0.227  0.337
Within (Iw)  0.155 0.141 0.179  –
Between (Ib)  0.062 0.053 0.048  –
%of Ib  28.6% 27.3% 21.1%  –
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If proceeding this way, any further 2 or higher dimensional partitioning could 
increase the share of inequality that is due to the divergence between the households 
nested in the respective subgroups. However, this approach could lead to an increase 
in between-group component only as a result of the increase of the number of 
subgroups (i.e. the “finer partition characterization” argument, see e.g. Shorrocks & 
Wan, 2004). Still, other factors could influence this effect and – up to our knowledge 
– there are no strict proofs that identify the “finer partitioning” as invalid for 
inequality decomposition analysis. In any case, the partitioning combinations could be 





There are still opinions that Bulgarian civil society does not compel enough 
pressure regarding the issues of economic inequality. In the same time, there are 
persistent voices for the improvement of the social safety net in respect of its 
effectiveness and better social targeting. M.Ivanova (2007: 20) accurately summarizes 
the unfavorable situation in Bulgaria stating that “… in reality, the ″results″ of social 
protection designed to follow the minimalist cost-containment strategies are only 
″positive″ for the state budget and the international creditors. Such policies not only 
contribute to the persistence of poverty and inequality, but also perpetuate a socio-
economic model that effectively reproduces generalized structures of inequality”. 
In this context, the application of quantile regression analysis identified 
several household variables as significant sources of income variation. The number of 
children, number of unemployed, or the number of pensioners has an adverse effect 
on the income per capita level. Similarly, households that inhabit settlements other 
than the capital city have (on average) lower income – this effect however tends to 
decrease when moving up the income distribution. Moreover, the results show that the 
Turkish community diverges significantly from the reference group (Bulgarians) at 
the lower part of the income distribution – such effects however disappear when 
considering the upper tail. 
Positive differential for the variable “number of employed” is estimated for the 
Turkish households. This effect is even higher for the Romas which reveals the 
importance of employment within these communities. Positive differential effects for   23
the Roma households regarding the number of children and the unemployed 
compensate the large negative effects estimated for the Bulgarians. This provides a 
possible explanation for the divergence of the attitude towards the direct and indirect 
social assistance measures discussed above (section 2.2). 
The income inequality decomposition results reported in this paper identify 
several socio-demographic household variables that contribute to the variation of per-
capita income. The largest share of the between group component is estimated for the 
number of unemployed in the households (24%) followed by the type of settlement 
and the ethnicity (about 15%). On the contrary, the number of pensioners does not 
show substantial contribution to the inequality level (about 2%) and the effect of the 
number of children is just moderate (9%). From the policy perspective these results 
demonstrate the necessity of additional efforts concerning the labor market policy as 
well as the decentralization and local development approaches. 
In general, the main results provide orientation regarding those Bulgarian 
households’ characteristics that could be targeted by the public policy instruments for 
poverty alleviation. However, such a decomposition analysis should be considered 
with caution. For example, the conclusion regarding the spatial location as a 
determinant of inequality should account for the fact that it encompasses the effects of 
a range of other factors (e.g. natural resources availability, weather conditions, 
cultural traditions, etc.). In this respect, Shorrocks and Wan (2004: 13) make an 
important notion that “… current procedures assign all of these factors to location 
without trying to disentangle the associated influences. The estimated between-group 
component cannot therefore be taken as a measure of the spatial contribution unless 
and until the definition of space is clarified. Furthermore, caution needs to be 
exercised when drawing policy implications from the empirical evidence.” 
In light of these arguments, a more detailed further analysis can reveal any 
effects of additional social and household characteristics that could potentially 
provide useful insights on the main sources of economic inequality in the country. 
The prospects of this analysis are promising in respect of the understanding and 
quantification of income differentiation among population subgroups identified as 
special targets of welfare support policies. Such an approach could be beneficial from 
a policy perspective if particular goals are set regarding the inequality dimension of 
the income policies – a policy setting that is not yet clearly revealed in Bulgarian 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. OLS and Quantile Regression analysis results, initial specification 
Variable 
OLS 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value 
Constant  5.476 0.000 5.027 0.000 5.137 0.000 5.285 0.000 5.391 0.000 5.515 0.000 5.630 0.000 5.741 0.000 5.944 0.000 6.154 0.000 






























































































































































































Own.of: Vehicle  0.195 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.211 0.000 
Own.of: Land spot  0.081 0.006 0.107 0.036 0.034 0.453 0.010 0.733 0.042 0.190 0.059 0.007 0.054 0.024 0.100 0.008 0.099 0.003 0.173 0.009 
Own.of: Dwelling 
-


























0.004 0.919 0.011 0.746 0.014 0.839 
N.return migrants  0.070 0.001 0.060 0.105 0.039 0.250 0.042 0.066 0.047 0.077 0.052 0.008 0.068 0.006 0.076 0.001 0.059 0.007 0.029 0.562 
R-square*  0.598 0.453 0.452 0.435 0.416 0.394 0.373 0.343 0.310 0.263 
* Pseudo R2 for Quantile Regressions; ** Dummy variables; Number of observations: 2705.   27
Table A2. OLS and Quantile Regression analysis results (with interaction) 
Characteristic 
OLS 10th 20th 
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value 
Constant  5.686 0.000  5.246 0.000  5.354 0.000 
Number of employed  0.050 0.000  0.063 0.001  0.063 0.000 
Number of unemployed  -0.281 0.000  -0.370 0.000  -0.357 0.000 
Number of children  -0.223 0.000  -0.240 0.000  -0.217 0.000 
Number of pensionners  -0.200 0.000  -0.205 0.000  -0.154 0.000 
Type of settlement - District center city**  -0.337 0.000  -0.366 0.000  -0.336 0.000 
Type of settlement - Other city/town**  -0.456 0.000  -0.541 0.000  -0.441 0.000 
Type of settlement - Rural**  -0.484 0.000  -0.527 0.000  -0.504 0.000 
Ownership of: Dwelling**  -0.008 0.751  -0.007 0.799  0.035 0.003 
Ownership of: Vehicle**  0.172 0.000  0.206 0.000  0.154 0.000 
Ownership of: Regulated land spot**  0.127 0.000  0.103 0.007  0.063 0.000 
Number of current migrants (abroad)  -0.047 0.198  -0.078 0.064  -0.077 0.000 
Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.064 0.033  0.005 0.899  0.011 0.514 
Ethic - Turkish**  -0.364 0.567  -0.057 0.703  -0.190 0.001 
T * Number of employed  0.065 0.044  0.073 0.091  0.099 0.000 
T * Number of unemployed  0.059 0.051  0.139 0.000  0.145 0.000 
T * Number of children  0.080 0.008  0.109 0.004  0.073 0.000 
T * Number of pensionners  0.158 0.000  0.285 0.000  0.218 0.000 
T * Type of settlement - District center city  -0.067 0.916  -0.501 0.000  -0.397 0.000 
T * Type of settlement - Other city/town  -0.150 0.813  -0.747 0.000  -0.659 0.000 
T * Type of settlement - Rural  -0.149 0.814  -0.610 0.000  -0.468 0.000 
T * Ownership of: Dwelling  0.009 0.894  0.017 0.823  -0.031 0.380 
T * Ownership of: Vehicle  -0.022 0.740  0.026 0.715  0.059 0.060 
T * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.123 0.132  -0.027 0.792  -0.059 0.165 
T * Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.117 0.097  0.176 0.003  0.183 0.000 
T * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  -0.079 0.172  0.058 0.377  0.017 0.567 
Ethic - Roma**  -1.700 0.000  -2.412 0.000  -1.832 0.000 
R * Number of employed  0.290 0.000  0.451 0.000  0.302 0.000 
R * Number of unemployed  0.200 0.000  0.278 0.000  0.260 0.000 
R * Number of children  0.115 0.000  0.205 0.000  0.113 0.000 
R * Number of pensionners  0.262 0.000  0.480 0.000  0.262 0.000 
R * Type of settlement - District center city  0.263 0.218  0.348 0.025  0.448 0.000 
R * Type of settlement - Other city/town  0.383 0.049  0.468 0.000  0.498 0.000 
R * Type of settlement - Rural  0.380 0.052  0.463 0.000  0.469 0.000 
R * Ownership of: Dwelling  0.022 0.741  0.019 0.790  -0.055 0.116 
R * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.210 0.016  0.152 0.012  0.071 0.041 
R * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  0.014 0.928  0.272 0.001  -0.107 0.137 
R * Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.108 0.270  -0.224 0.001  0.059 0.275 
R * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  -0.021 0.655  0.071 0.143  0.063 0.001 
Ethic - Other**  (dropped) -0.231  0.082  -0.370 0.000 
O * Number of employed  0.551 0.000  0.369 0.000  0.369 0.000 
O * Number of unemployed  0.076 0.311  0.202 0.000  0.189 0.000 
O * Number of children  0.033 0.694  0.048 0.211  0.025 0.291 
O * Number of pensionners  0.245 0.090  0.176 0.000  0.125 0.002 
O * Type of settlement - District center city  -0.265 0.601  (dropped)  (dropped) 
O * Type of settlement - Other city/town  -1.045 0.013  -0.429 0.004  -0.498 0.000 
O * Type of settlement - Rural  -1.340 0.000  -0.652 0.000  -0.645 0.000 
O * Ownership of: Dwelling  -0.076 0.782  0.007 0.916  -0.035 0.460 
O * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.394 0.168  0.591 0.000  0.643 0.000 
O * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.135 0.640  -0.772 0.000  -0.654 0.000 
O * Number of current migrants (abroad)  -1.623 0.042  -1.171 0.000  -1.172 0.000 
O * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.400 0.277  -0.204 0.079  -0.210 0.022 
Pseudo R-square for Quant.Regression  0.624 0.478 0.469 
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Table A2 (cont.) 
Characteristic 
30th 40th 50th  60th 
Coef P-v. Coef P-v. Coef P-v. Coef P-v. 
Constant  5.447 0.000  5.562 0.000  5.665 0.000  5.794 0.000 
Number of employed  0.063 0.000  0.055 0.000  0.048 0.000  0.032 0.000 
Number of unemployed  -0.311 0.000 -0.300 0.000  -0.277 0.000  -0.285 0.000 
Number of children  -0.218 0.000 -0.219 0.000  -0.232 0.000  -0.232 0.000 
Number of pensionners  -0.157 0.000 -0.168 0.000  -0.166 0.000  -0.185 0.000 
Type of settlement - District center city**  -0.332 0.000 -0.336 0.000  -0.309 0.000  -0.290 0.000 
Type of settlement - Other city/town**  -0.436 0.000 -0.432 0.000  -0.445 0.000  -0.383 0.000 
Type of settlement - Rural**  -0.490 0.000 -0.458 0.000  -0.460 0.000  -0.450 0.000 
Ownership of: Dwelling**  0.028 0.080  0.012  0.393 -0.001  0.885 -0.035 0.000 
Ownership of: Vehicle**  0.160 0.000  0.170 0.000  0.159 0.000  0.163 0.000 
Ownership of: Regulated land spot**  0.059 0.006  0.058 0.002  0.095 0.000  0.108 0.000 
Number of current migrants (abroad)  -0.131 0.000 -0.102 0.000  -0.084 0.000  -0.059 0.000 
Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.051 0.011  0.085 0.000  0.081 0.000  0.102 0.000 
Ethic - Turkish**  -0.220 0.004 -0.368 0.000  -0.414 0.000  -0.445 0.000 
T * Number of employed  0.071 0.002  0.096 0.000  0.090 0.000  0.091 0.000 
T * Number of unemployed  0.068 0.001  0.077 0.000  0.051 0.000  0.059 0.000 
T * Number of children  0.065 0.002  0.046 0.026  0.018 0.165 0.010  0.416 
T * Number of pensionners  0.118 0.000  0.112 0.000  0.095 0.000  0.089 0.000 
T * Type of settlement - District center city  -0.204 0.002 -0.093  0.129  -0.049 0.238  0.019 0.630 
T * Type of settlement - Other city/town  -0.439 0.000 -0.268 0.000  -0.192 0.000  -0.157 0.000 
T * Type of settlement - Rural  -0.183 0.009 -0.099  0.114  0.004 0.933  0.038 0.322 
T * Ownership of: Dwelling  -0.005 0.916  0.029  0.507  0.064 0.035  0.052 0.071 
T * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.026 0.578 -0.003  0.948 -0.045  0.124 -0.071 0.010 
T * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.069 0.248 -0.132 0.012  -0.138 0.000  -0.128 0.000 
T * Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.173 0.000  0.157 0.000  0.149 0.000  0.125 0.000 
T * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  -0.061 0.116 -0.074 0.047  -0.076 0.003  -0.133 0.000 
Ethic - Roma**  -1.803 0.000 -1.424 0.000  -1.529 0.000  -1.559 0.000 
R * Number of employed  0.249 0.000  0.276 0.000  0.260 0.000  0.282 0.000 
R * Number of unemployed  0.205 0.000  0.197 0.000  0.202 0.000  0.222 0.000 
R * Number of children  0.092 0.000  0.095 0.000  0.124 0.000  0.089 0.000 
R * Number of pensionners  0.199 0.000  0.225 0.000  0.219 0.000  0.231 0.000 
R * Type of settlement - District center city  0.432 0.000  0.128  0.307 0.156  0.062 0.219 0.002 
R * Type of settlement - Other city/town  0.642 0.000  0.224 0.041  0.225 0.002  0.194 0.002 
R * Type of settlement - Rural  0.603 0.000  0.201  0.074  0.273 0.000  0.378 0.000 
R * Ownership of: Dwelling  0.089 0.058  0.039  0.374  0.083 0.007  0.092 0.001 
R * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.049 0.395  0.041  0.471  0.143 0.000  0.106 0.005 
R * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.214 0.046  0.048  0.596  0.045 0.500  0.000 0.997 
R * Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.055 0.391  0.002  0.970  0.184 0.000  0.099 0.004 
R * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.026 0.310 -0.034  0.133  -0.070 0.000  -0.103 0.000 
Ethic - Other**  -0.467 0.001 -0.418 0.008  -0.505 0.000  -0.641 0.000 
O * Number of employed  0.369 0.000  0.360 0.000  0.456 0.000  0.496 0.000 
O * Number of unemployed  0.143 0.000  0.141 0.000  0.101 0.000  0.104 0.000 
O * Number of children  0.027 0.513  0.132 0.000  0.091 0.000  0.077 0.000 
O * Number of pensionners  0.128 0.024  0.144 0.033  0.133 0.005  0.149 0.001 
O * Type of settlement - District center city  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)  (dropped) 



























O * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.636 0.000  0.692 0.000  0.473 0.000  0.408 0.000 
O * Ownership of: Regulated land spot 
-
0.650 0.000  0.143 0.199 
-
0.027 0.762  0.054 0.532 









O * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  1.014 0.000  0.481 0.000  0.423 0.000  0.258 0.003 
Pseudo R-square for Quant.Regression  0.452 0.434 0.414  0.395   29
Table A2 (cont.) 
Characteristic 
70th 80th 90th 
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value 
Constant  5.946 0.000  6.063 0.000  6.306 0.000 
Number of employed  0.010 0.269  0.003 0.838  -0.002 0.935 
Number of unemployed  -0.283 0.000  -0.254 0.000  -0.243 0.000 
Number of children  -0.225 0.000  -0.227 0.000  -0.238 0.000 
Number of pensionners  -0.191 0.000  -0.221 0.000  -0.248 0.000 
Type of settlement - District center city**  -0.272 0.000  -0.263 0.000  -0.332 0.000 
Type of settlement - Other city/town**  -0.352 0.000  -0.347 0.000  -0.429 0.000 
Type of settlement - Rural**  -0.425 0.000  -0.413 0.000  -0.436 0.000 
Ownership of: Dwelling**  -0.081 0.000  -0.039 0.158  -0.024 0.575 
Ownership of: Vehicle**  0.149 0.000  0.161 0.000  0.174 0.000 
Ownership of: Regulated land spot**  0.168 0.000  0.167 0.000  0.214 0.000 
Number of current migrants (abroad)  -0.002 0.929  0.017 0.698  0.003 0.968 
Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.071 0.001  0.046 0.190  0.116 0.040 
Ethic - Turkish**  -0.533 0.000  -0.816 0.000  -1.128 0.000 
T * Number of employed  0.103 0.000  0.161 0.000  0.164 0.012 
T * Number of unemployed  0.065 0.034  0.080 0.157  0.063 0.411 
T * Number of children  0.017 0.456  0.058 0.067  0.093 0.035 
T * Number of pensionners  0.092 0.010  0.141 0.018  0.193 0.042 
T * Type of settlement - District center city  0.007 0.924  0.115 0.345  0.642 0.000 
T * Type of settlement - Other city/town  -0.134 0.085  0.135 0.295  0.375 0.032 
T * Type of settlement - Rural  0.029 0.702  0.121 0.340  0.287 0.101 
T * Ownership of: Dwelling  0.094 0.084  0.144 0.091  0.131 0.315 
T * Ownership of: Vehicle  -0.097 0.055  -0.137 0.095  -0.079 0.521 
T * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.197 0.001  -0.253 0.011  -0.256 0.091 
T * Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.062 0.192  0.072 0.351  0.023 0.816 
T * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  -0.110 0.008  -0.162 0.018  -0.258 0.024 
Ethic - Roma**  -1.681 0.000  -1.690 0.000  -1.964 0.000 
R * Number of employed  0.279 0.000  0.229 0.000  0.265 0.000 
R * Number of unemployed  0.217 0.000  0.163 0.000  0.197 0.000 
R * Number of children  0.068 0.000  0.065 0.015  0.076 0.003 
R * Number of pensionners  0.244 0.000  0.179 0.002  0.168 0.033 
R * Type of settlement - District center city  0.242 0.077  0.301 0.106  0.646 0.012 
R * Type of settlement - Other city/town  0.296 0.015  0.474 0.001  0.713 0.001 
R * Type of settlement - Rural  0.462 0.000  0.714 0.000  0.930 0.000 
R * Ownership of: Dwelling  0.162 0.001  0.075 0.351  -0.085 0.361 
R * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.219 0.001  0.287 0.005  0.473 0.003 
R * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.052 0.642  -0.016 0.928  -0.108 0.703 
R * Number of current migrants (abroad)  0.275 0.000  0.238 0.028  0.033 0.796 
R * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  -0.082 0.001  -0.061 0.141  0.130 0.065 
Ethic - Other**  0.257 0.120  0.336 0.194  -0.145 0.546 
O * Number of employed  0.701 0.000  0.836 0.000  0.882 0.000 
O * Number of unemployed  0.065 0.151  0.027 0.735  0.108 0.073 
O * Number of children  -0.040 0.321  -0.147 0.012  -0.141 0.017 
O * Number of pensionners  0.137 0.022  0.080 0.447  -0.017 0.801 
O * Type of settlement - District center city  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
O * Type of settlement - Other city/town  -1.515 0.000  -1.836 0.000  -1.648 0.000 
O * Type of settlement - Rural  -1.692 0.000  -1.690 0.000  -1.548 0.000 
O * Ownership of: Dwelling  -0.125 0.375  -0.015 0.949  0.029 0.865 
O * Ownership of: Vehicle  0.621 0.000  0.537 0.001  0.473 0.000 
O * Ownership of: Regulated land spot  -0.098 0.462  -0.359 0.121  -0.126 0.434 
O * Number of current migrants (abroad)  -2.802 0.000  -3.355 0.000  -3.216 0.000 
O * Number of return migrants (from abroad)  0.515 0.000  0.804 0.000  0.160 0.337 
Pseudo R-square for Quant.Regression  0.370 0.345 0.313 
 